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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Div. 31, 199 N. Y. S. 66, it was held that where the plaintiff was employed
as a general manager and director of a musical comedy and by conduct and
derogatory statements abused his employer, that such were sufficient
grounds to justify a dismissal.
The use by a salaried employee of a corporation of insulting, disrespectful
or abusive language to any officer or superior employee thereof in connec-
tion with the duties of the former, or his refusal to obey, or his advice to
other employees to disobey the orders of any superior, is a good ground for
discharging him. Darst v. Mathieson Alkali Works (1896), 81 F. 284. A
servant owes to a master respectful and decorous treatment. Unprovoked
insolence and disrespect for him or his representatives will usually justify
the servant's discharge. This is clearly illustrated in Darden V. Nolan
(1849), 4 La. Ann. 374; and in Board of Education of City of Lawton v.
Gossett (1916), 56 Ok. 95, 155 P. 856.
Therefore, in view of these numerous authorities, it would seem that there
was no error committed in the principal case, and that the question of the
right to discharge an employee who uses disrespectful language towards
his employer was properly left to the jury for determination as to whether
justifihble under the existing facts and circumstances. C. R. S., '30.
PARTNERSHIP-SERVICES AND COMPENSATION OF PARTNER.-Plaintiff and
defendant were partners in a filling station run by hired hands with occa-
sional supervision by themselves, each of them living in another town and
working at his individual business. After three years, the business being
in a bad condition, defendant suggested that plaintiff visit the oil station.
Plaintiff gave his whole time and attention to the management of the busi-
ness for four years. Until dissolution of the partnership plaintiff made no
claim for salary for the management, while defendant was absent and de-
voting himself to his personal business. Held, that plaintiff is entitled to a
salary on implied contract for services rendered, and that the co-partner
failing in his duty of giving his services to advance the business should pay
the plaintiff who gave his whole time. Montgomery v. Burch (Tex. 1928),
11 S. W. (2d) 545.
The rule at old common law is that one partner can make no claims for
compensation for services from his partner, since each has the duty to de-
vote his time and energy to the partnership. This applies today to the or-
dinary case of partnership where each partner works in and for the busi-
ness, or where one advances capital and the other gives his time. Lindley,
PARTNERSHIP, p. 454; Frazier v. Frazier (1883), 77 Va. 775; Caldwell V.
Lieber (1839), 15 N. Y. Ch. 483; Peck v. Alexander (1907), 40 Colo. 392, 91
P. 38; Talbert v. Hamlin (1910), 86 S. C. 523, 68 S. E. 764, 17 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 412.
By express contract one partner may charge the other partner for serv-
ices rendered. There seems little reason to restrict the power of contract to
exclude this definite, deliberate agreement. Mechem, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP,
Washington University Open Scholarship
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
2d ed., see. 178-9; Martin v. McBryle (1921), 182 N. C. 175, 108 S. E. 739,
21 A. L. R. 12, 48.
However, many cases have allowed the partner to recover on an implied
contract for services to the partnership. This is implied either from cus-
tom or from the course of dealing of the partnership, showing expectation
and understanding without express agreement, that certain services of the
partner be paid for. Each case rests on its own particular facts. The
typical case is where an active and managing partner devotes his whole time
and attention to a partnership business at the instance of other partners
who are attending to their individual businesses and giving no time or at-
tention to the business of the firm. A request of the partners for the plain-
tiff to give his services is the strongest evidence of their intention to com-
pensate him. Other factors are the course of business or the nature of the
services. The real basis of this situation lies in contract, so the elements
of implied contract must be shown. Rains v. Weiler (1917), 101 Kan. 294,
166 P. 235, L. R. A. 1917F 571; Emerson v. Durand (1885), 64 Wis. 111, 24
N. W. 129, 54 Am. Rep. 593; Lewis v. Mofret (1849), 11 Ill. 392; Morris v.
Grifin (1891), 83 Iowa 327, 49 N. W. 846; Hoag v. Alderman (1903), 184
Mass. 217, 68 N. E. 199; Cramer v. Bachman (1878), 68 Mo. 310; Maynard
v. Maynard (1917), 147 Ga. 178, 93 S. E. 289, L. R. A. 1918A 81, Sons v.
Sons (1922), 151 Minn. 336, 186 N. W. 809; Rowley, MODERN LAW OF PART-
NURSHIP, secs. 404-7.
A request by the dormant partner is not a sine qua non, so in the present
case the court need not have construed defendant's suggestion that plaintiff
visit the station as a request to devote his whole time for several years.
Circumstances may show intention without any request.
It is said that in order wholly to justify such a claim from the relations
inter sese alone without other evidence of contract, the partnership situation,
under which plaintiff claims, should be greatly different from what was
expected at the time the express agreement of partnership was made; i. e.,
the defendant should be in default as to his duty. Gilmore, PARTNERSHIP,
388-4. For if a salary was expected to be paid, it should have been men-
tioned in the articles of partnership. But either default by one partner or
reasonable intention from the circumstances will justify the claim. If the
intention exists, default, by fiction as in the instant case or otherwise, is not
necessary.
The rule set forth in the Uniform Partnership Act, Sec. 18, is that,
subject to any agreement between them, . . . (f) No part-
ner is entitled to remuneration for acting in the partnership business, ex-
cept that a surviving partner is entitled to reasonable compensation for his
services in winding up the partnership affairs." The last clause is a
statutory exception, but the general rule is stated. However, it will be
noted that the general introduction to the section states "subject to any
agreement between them"; this will, it would seem, allow implied contracts
to alter the general situation.
It is well to remember that the facts must be strongly in favor of the
plaintiff to allow him to set up a contract implied in fact without statements
or representations by the parties. R. J. H., '30.
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